Abstract. This paper is concerned with the mathematical analysis of emissions markets. We review the existing quantitative analyses on the subject and introduce some of the mathematical challenges posed by the implementation of the new phase of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme as well as the cap-and-trade schemes touted by the U.S., Canada, Australia, and Japan. From a practical point of view, the main thrust of the paper is the design and numerical analysis of new cap-and-trade schemes for the control and reduction of atmospheric pollution. We develop tools intended to help policy makers and regulators understand the pros and cons of the emissions markets. We propose a model for an economy where risk neutral firms produce goods to satisfy an inelastic demand and are endowed with permits in order to offset their pollution at compliance time and avoid having to pay a penalty. Firms that can easily reduce emissions do so, while those for which it is harder buy permits from firms that anticipate they will not need all their permits, creating a financial market for pollution credits. Our equilibrium model elucidates the joint price formation for goods and pollution allowances, capturing most of the features of the first phase of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. We show existence of an equilibrium and uniqueness of emissions credit prices. We also characterize the equilibrium prices of goods and the optimal production and trading strategies of the firms. We use the electricity market in Texas to numerically illustrate the qualitative properties of these cap-and-trade schemes. Comparing the numerical implications of cap-and-trade schemes to the business-as-usual benchmark, we show that our numerical results match those observed during the implementation of the first phase of the European Union cap-and-trade CO 2 emissions scheme. In particular, we confirm the presence of windfall profits criticized by the opponents of these markets. We also demonstrate the shortcomings of tax and subsidy alternatives. Finally we introduce a relative allocation scheme which, while easy to implement, leads to smaller windfall profits than the standard scheme.
believe that the free distribution of allowances is not the only reason for producers' windfall profits. This phenomenon is more subtle: it can happen in a competitive setting even in simple deterministic models. For the sake of illustration, we present a simple instance of these profits.
Let us consider a set of firms that must satisfy a demand of D = 1 MWh of electricity at each time t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, and let us assume that there are only two possible technologies to produce electricity: gas technology, which has unit cost $2 and emits 1 ton of CO 2 per MWh produced, and coal technology, which has unit cost $1 and emits 2 tons of CO 2 per MWh. In this simple model, the total capacity of gas is 1 MWh and the total capacity of coal is also 1 MWh. We also suppose that producers face a penalty of π dollars per ton of CO 2 not offset by credits, and that a total of T − 1 credits are distributed to the firms, allowing them to offset altogether T − 1 tons of CO 2 . Here π is a number strictly greater than 1. In this situation, we arrive at two conclusions. First, as demand needs to be met, total emissions will be greater than or equal to T tons, even if all firms use the clean technology (gas). Second, firms are always better off reducing emissions than paying the penalty. As a consequence, the optimal generation strategy is to only use gas technology and emit T tons of CO 2 . At least one firm has to pay the penalty and the price of emission credits is necessarily equal to π at each time. The missing credit has a value π for both the buyer and the seller, so the price of electricity is 2 + π because a marginal decrease in demand will induce a marginal gain in generation cost and a marginal decrease in penalty paid. The total profit for the producers is π(T − 1), the penalty paid by the producers to the regulator is π, and the total cost for the customers is (2 + π)T . Consider now, still in the competitive equilibrium framework, the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario: the demand is met by using coal technology, the price of electricity is 1, the total profit for producers is 0, and the total cost for the customers is T . In this simple example the producers' cost induced by the trading scheme is T + π; producers must buy more expensive fuel, so a profit T is made by the fuel supplier and the producers have to pay the penalty π. The increase in fuel price, or switching cost, is a marginal cost that must factor into the electricity price. The penalty is a fixed cost paid at the end, but we see that in this trading scheme, this fixed cost is rolled over the entire period and paid by the customers at each time, inducing a windfall profit for the producers. This windfall profit is exactly equal to the market value of the T − 1 credits. However, notice that if we increase the demand to 2 MWh at each time t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, then the windfall profits exceed the market value of the allowances.
Another feature of emissions trading schemes is the risk of noncompliance faced by the producers and the regulator. The EU-ETS was introduced as a way to comply with the targets set by the Kyoto Protocol. Phase 1 of the Kyoto Protocol sets a fixed cap for annual emissions of CO 2 by the year 2012 for all industrialized countries that ratified the protocol (Annex I countries). This reduction should guarantee on average a level of emissions of no more than 95% of what it was in the year 1990. All countries are free to adopt the emission reduction policy of their choice, but in case of noncompliance in 2012, they face a penalty (payment of 1.3 emission allowances for each ton not offset in Phase 1). The EU-ETS was designed to ensure compliance for the whole EU zone. However, in an uncertain environment, there is a distinct possibility that the scheme will eventually fall short of its goal and that producers will exceed the fixed cap set at the beginning of the compliance period. In this case, it is the regulator's responsibility either to pay a penalty or to comply with the target by relying on one or more of three flexible mechanisms: International Emission Trading, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI). International Emission Trading allows Annex 1 countries to exchange allowances to meet their Kyoto targets, while CDM and JI allow Annex 1 countries or companies settled in Annex 1 countries to generate allowances by financing emission reduction projects in other Annex 1 countries or in less developed countries. These allowances are called Certified Emission Reductions, or CERs, and are also worth one ton of CO 2 equivalent. The design of emission trading schemes must also address this question and possibly limit or control the use of these CERs. The reader is referred to [5] for a mathematical discussion of CER price formation.
In the present work, we give a precise mathematical foundation to the analysis of emission trading schemes and quantitatively investigate the impact of emission regulation on consumer costs and firm profits. Based on a model for perfect competition, we show that, in equilibrium, a standard emission trading scheme combines two contrasting aspects. On the one hand, the system reduces pollution at the lowest cost for society, as expected. On the other hand, it forces a notable transfer of wealth from consumers to producers, which in general exceeds the social costs of pollution reduction.
In a perfect economy where all customers are shareholders, windfall profits are redistributed, at least partially through dividend payments. However, this situation is not always the case, and the impact of regulation on prices needs to be addressed. There are several other ways to return part of the windfall profits to consumers. The most prominent ones are taxation and charging for the initial allowance distribution. Beyond the political risks associated with the levy of new taxes, we will show that one of the main disadvantages of this first method is its poor control of the final level of emissions under random demand for goods and stochastic abatement costs.
Concerning auctioning, it is important to notice that, for the second phase of the EU-ETS, individual countries did not have to give away all their credit allowances for free. They could choose to auction up to 10% of their total allowances. Strangely enough, except for Denmark, none of them exercised this option. On the other hand, auctioning the entire set of initial allowances as a way to abolish windfall profits loses one of the main features of cap-and-trade schemes, namely, the mechanism which controls incentives to invest in and develop cleaner production technologies. Indeed, a significant reduction of windfall profits through auctioning, if at all possible, requires the auctioning of a huge number of allowances, possibly even the total initial allocation. Further, it involves a significant risk for companies since the capital invested to procure allowances at the auction may be higher than the income later recovered from allowance prices. For a nontechnical discussion of the pros and cons of auctioning of EU-ETS phase II allowances, the interested reader is referred to [15] . A quantitative analysis of some of these issues is provided in [4] .
In this work, we argue that cap-and-trade schemes can work, even in the form implemented in the first phase of EU-ETS, at least as long as allowance allocation is properly implemented. Moreover, we prove that it is possible to design emission trading schemes that overcome most of the problems documented so far. We show how to establish trading schemes that reduce windfall profits while exhibiting the same emission reduction performance as the generic cap-and-trade system used in the first phase of the EU-ETS. These schemes also have the nice feature that a significant number of the allowances can be allocated as initial allocation to encourage cleaner technologies.
Despite frequent articles in the popular press and numerous speculative debates in specialized magazines and talk shows, the scientific literature on cap-and-trade systems is rather limited. We briefly mention a few related works chosen because of their relevance to our agenda. The authors of [11] and [19] proposed a market model for the public good environment introduced by tradable emission credits. Using a static model for a perfect market with pollution certificates, [19] showed that there exists a minimum cost equilibrium for companies facing a given environmental target. The conceptual basis for dynamic permit trading was addressed in, among others, [10] , [26] , [21] , [17] , [22] , and [23] . Meanwhile, the recent work [23] suggests also a continuous-time model for carbon price formation. Beyond these examples, there exists a vast literature on several related topics, including equilibrium [2] , empirical evidence from existing markets [16] , [24] , and uncertainty and risk [13] , [18] , [27] . The model we present below follows the baseline suggested in [12] .
EU-ETS. In January 2005 the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission
Trading Scheme began operation as the largest (more than 10,000 installations from various sectors) multicountry (15 EU members), multisector (power generation, oil refining, coke ovens, metal industry, production of cement and lime, etc.) greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading scheme worldwide. The scheme is based on Directive 2003/87/EC from October 25, 2003 [1] . It follows a downstream approach in the sense that fuel end users instead of the fuel producers are liable under the scheme. We review the salient features of its implementation in order to motivate some of the assumptions made in the paper and to illustrate some of our technical results.
The total number of emission rights actually allocated at the beginning of the program was chosen at the beginning of the program on the basis of National Allocation Plans (NAPs) presented by each of the 15 participating countries. As we will show in our analysis, the total number of emission rights injected into the system plays a crucial role in the price of the allowances (see also the comments following Figure  1 .1) and obviously the level of emission reduction at the end of the program. We will also show that the way in which this total allocation of emission rights is distributed among the participant installations is much less relevant, playing essentially no role in the final level of emission reduction and only impacting the distribution of the costs of the climate policy.
During the first phase, a penalty of π = 40€ was levied for each ton of emitted CO 2 not covered by a surrendered allowance certificate. This penalty was raised to π = 100€ in the second phase of the EU-ETS. In a typical cap-and-trade scheme, at the end of each compliance period an independent authority tallies the emissions of each installation, and those installations that cannot surrender as many allowances as the total number of tons of CO 2 emitted will pay a fine computed as the number of uncovered tons of CO 2 times the penalty level. Moreover, they will have to purchase and surrender as many certificates from those to be issued for the next compliance period. So, de facto, the actual cost for each ton of CO 2 not covered by a surrendered emission permit is equal to the penalty plus the spot price of one certificate from the next period. This fact is incorporated in the models used in [7, 8, 9] . However, for the sake of simplicity, the equilibrium models introduced in this paper cover only a single one-year period, and they do not include this carry-over feature of the penalty. Figure 1 .1 illustrates what happened in April 2006, nine months before the end of the first phase of the EU-ETS and right after the public announcement of the level of emissions for the year 2005. Installations realized that the level of emissions had been overestimated and that emission rights were going to be in oversupply. After the announcement, all the futures prices dropped dramatically, but because the European Union Allowances (EUAs) issued for the first phase could not be banked, the price of the first phase allowances did not recover. In fact, these prices ended up essentially converging to 0. Not only is this phenomenon intuitively clear, but we will show that it happens in great generality. Indeed, our theoretical analysis shows that, in a capand-trade scheme without banking like the first phase of the EU-ETS, the price of an allowance certificate converges to a two-valued random variable, those two values being 0 and the penalty level imposed by the regulator. The price converges toward 0 in the case of oversupply of certificates, and this is exactly what happened. Should this be regarded as a flaw of the scheme, criticism should be directed toward the regulator who should not have flooded the market with an oversupply of certificates. As transparency in price formation increases and carbon price signals become reliable, the market for futures contracts on EUAs gained in liquidity and options on these futures contracts are now traded in significant numbers. While equilibrium models like those presented in this paper are of great value to understand the inner workings of these markets, they have little to offer when it comes to pricing and hedging these derivatives. These tasks are better performed with simpler reduced form models designed for their tractability and the ease with which they can be calibrated to price data. Such a model is proposed in [8] , and we expect that more research in this direction will develop in the near future.
Another interesting phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 1 .2. The price of CERs is not equal to the price of an EUA even though a CER, like an EUA, is a certificate that can be used to offset one ton-equivalent of CO 2 emissions. An equilibrium theory in the spirit of the theory presented in this paper is possible: prices of goods, EUAs, and CERs result jointly from such an equilibrium, and price spreads like the one illustrated in Figure 1 .2 can be explained. However, these models are more involved, with rather tedious notation, and in order to avoid distracting the reader from the main thrust of the paper with mathematical technicalities, we chose not to present these results in this survey. Instead, we refer the interested reader to [5] .
Summary.
We close this rather lengthy introduction with a quick summary of the contents of the paper.
Section 2 gives the details of the mathematical model used to capture the dynamic features of a cap-and-trade system in an uncertain environment where demand for goods and costs of production are random. We introduce the notation needed to describe the production of goods and the profit mechanisms in a competitive economy. Exogenous demand for goods is modeled by means of adapted stochastic processes. We assume that demand is inelastic in the sense that it has to be met exactly by supply. This assumption could be viewed as restrictive, but we argue that it is quite realistic in the case of the electricity markets. We also introduce the emissions allowance allocations and the rules of trading in these allowances. Section 3 defines the notion of competitive equilibrium for risk neutral firms involved in our cap-and-trade scheme. Preliminary work shows that most of the theoretical results of this paper still hold for risk averse firms if preferences are modeled with exponential utility. However, in order to avoid muddying the water with unnecessary technical issues which could distract the reader from the important issues of pollution abatement, we restrict ourselves to the less technical case of risk neutral firms. For the sake of completeness, we solve the equilibrium problem in the BAU case corresponding to the absence of a market for emissions permits. In this case, as expected, the prices of goods are given by the standard merit order pricing typical of deregulated markets. The section closes with the proof of a couple of enlightening necessary conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in our framework. These mathematical results show that, at compliance time, the equilibrium price of an emission certificate can be equal only to 0 or to the penalty level chosen by the regulator. The second important necessary condition proven in this section shows that, in equilibrium, the prices of the goods are still given by a merit order pricing provided that the production costs are adjusted for the cost of emissions. This result is important as it shows exactly how the price of pollution gets incorporated in the prices of goods in the presence of a cap-and-trade scheme. The following section 4 is devoted to the rigorous proof of the existence of an equilibrium. The proof uses classical functional analysis results from optimization theory in infinite-dimensional spaces. It follows the lines of a standard argument based on the analysis of what an informed central planner (representative agent ) would do in order to minimize the social cost of meeting the demand for goods.
Section 5 is devoted to the analysis of the standard cap-and-trade scheme featured in the implementation of the first phase of the EU-ETS. By comparison with BAU scenarios, we show that properly chosen levels of penalty and pollution certificate allocations lead to desired emissions targets. However, our numerical experiments with data from the electricity market in Texas show the existence of excessive windfall profits. Our choice of Texas was made for several compelling reasons. This region, known as ERCOT, is one of three electrical interconnections in the U.S. It is essentially isolated from the others in the sense that there are no synchronous electrical interconnections between ERCOT and the rest of the U.S. or Mexico, and only one direct high voltage connection. This electrical isolation, together with the information readily available concerning power generation capacity and fuel types, made Texas the natural choice for our case study. It is important to emphasize that the results of our numerical experiments are typical of many electricity markets. The interested reader can consult [6] for a similar case study devoted to the analysis of the potential impacts of cap-and-trade schemes on the Japanese electric sector. As explained earlier in our literature review, windfall profits have been observed in the first phase of EU-ETS, giving credibility to the critics of cap-and-trade systems. Section 6 can be viewed as the main thrust of the paper beyond the theoretical results proven up to that point. We propose a general framework including taxes and subsidies along with the standard cap-and-trade schemes. We demonstrate the shortcomings of tax systems which suffer from poor control of windfall profits and unexpected expensive reduction policies when it comes to emissions reduction targets under stochastic abatement costs. We concentrate our analysis on several alternative cap-and-trade schemes and show numerically that a relative allocation scheme can resolve most of the issues with the other schemes. Such a relative allocation scheme is easy to describe and implement as pollution allowances are distributed proportionally to production. It is reminiscent of the output-based allocation schemes touted in some of the nontechnical economic studies of cap-and-trade schemes. See, for example, [3] and [14] for discussions in deterministic settings of the impact of such schemes on the so-called leakage effect. Even though the number of permits is random in a relative scheme and hence cannot be known exactly in advance, its statistical distribution is well understood as it is merely a scaled version of the distribution of the demands for goods. Consequently, setting up caps to meet pollution targets is not much different from standard cap-andtrade schemes. Moreover, the coefficient of proportionality providing the number of permits is an extra parameter which should make calibration more efficient. Indeed, one shows that, properly calibrated, the relative schemes reach the same pollution targets as the standard schemes while, at the same time, keeping consumer burden and windfall profits in control.
Section 7 gathers more mathematical properties of the generalized cap-and-trade schemes introduced in the previous section. Our results demonstrate the versatility and flexibility of such a generalized framework. They show that regulators can control cap-and-trade schemes in order to reach preassigned pollution targets with zero windfall profits and reasonably small consumer costs, or even to force equilibrium electricity prices to be equal to target prices. However, because of the level of complexity of their implementations, it is unlikely that the schemes identified there will be used by policy makers or regulators. The paper concludes with section 8, which reviews the main results of the paper, recasting them in the perspective of the public policy challenging issues uncovered by the results of the paper.
Mathematical Model for a Standard
Cap-and-Trade Scheme. In this section we present the elements of our mathematical analysis. We consider an economy where firms produce and supply goods to end-consumers over a period [0, T ]. The production of these goods is a source of pollutant emissions. In order to reduce this externality, a regulator distributes emissions allowances to the firms at time 0, allows them to trade the allowances on an organized market between times 0 and T , and, at the end of this compliance period, levies penalties proportionally to their net cumulative emissions. As explained in the introduction above, our stylized scheme does not allow for banking in the sense that unused allowances cannot be used in future compliance periods. We also ignore the need to borrow allowances from the next period allocation in order to cover the emissions which could not be offset by the redemption of allowance certificates from the current compliance period. This simplifying assumption allows us to treat the compliance period in isolation. However, as can be seen from the analysis of more realistic models, our quantitative results still hold in more general setups without these simplifying assumptions. See, for example, [9] , [8] , and [5] In what follows, (Ω, F , F = {F t , t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T }}, P) is a filtered probability space. We denote by E[.] the expectation operator under the probability P and by E t [.] the expectation operator conditional on F t . The σ-field F t represents the information available at time t. We will also make use of the notation P t (.) := E t [1 {.} ] for the conditional probability with respect to F t .
Production of Goods.
A finite set I of firms produces and sells a set K of different goods at times 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. Each firm i ∈ I has access to a set J i,k of different technologies, to produce good k ∈ K, that are sources of emissions (e.g.,
of producing one unit of good k at time t; • an emission factor e i,j,k ≥ 0 measuring the volume of pollutants emitted per unit of good k produced by firm i with technology j; • a production capacity κ i,j,k . The fact that κ i,j,k is not random and is constant over time rules out the possibility of taking plants offline for maintenance or emergency repairs. Doing so would significantly increase the complexity of notations that are already cumbersome enough, without much changing the nature of the results, so we decided to refrain from doing so. For the sake of notation we introduce the index sets
Since electricity production from fossil fuels is the main source of CO 2 emissions, our main example of a produced good is electric power. We make the assumption that the production costs are nonnegative, adapted, and integrable processes.
of good k ∈ K, throughout the period [t, t + 1), using the technology j ∈ J i,k . Since the choice of the production level ξ i,j,k t is based only on present and past observations, the processes ξ i,j,k are also supposed to be adapted and, since production cannot exceed capacity, we require that the inequalities
hold almost surely. Our market is driven by an exogenous and inelastic demand for goods. Since electricity production is a significant proportion of the emissions covered by the existing schemes, this inelasticity assumption is reasonable. We denote by D k t the demand at time t for good k ∈ K. This demand process is supposed to be adapted to the filtration {F t } t . For each good k ∈ K, we assume that the demand is always smaller than the total production capacity for this good, namely, that
This assumption is a natural extension of the assumption of inelasticity of the demand as it will conveniently discard issues such as blackouts, which would only be a distraction given the purposes of the paper.
Emission Trading.
We denote by π ∈ [0, ∞) the penalty per unit of pollutant. As reported in the introduction, in the original design of the EU-ETS π was set to 40€ per metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO 2 e). For each firm, the net cumulative emission is the amount of emissions which have not been offset by allowances at the end of the compliance period. It is computed at time T as the difference between the total amount of pollutants emitted over the entire period [0, T ] minus the number of allowances held by the firm at time T and redeemed for the purpose of emissions abatement. The net cumulative emission is this difference, whenever positive, and 0 otherwise.
For the sake of simplicity we assume that the entire period [0, T ] corresponds to one simple compliance period. We explained the far-reaching consequences of this assumption in the previous subsection. In particular, at maturity T , all the firms have to cover their emissions by allowances or pay a penalty. Moreover, certificates become worthless if not used as we do not allow banking from one phase to the next. So, in this economy, operators of installations that emit pollutants will have two fundamental choices in order to avoid unwanted penalties: reduce emissions by production with cleaner technologies or buy allowances.
At time t = 0, each firm i ∈ I is endowed with Λ i = Λ i 0 pollution permits called allowances. So if it were to hold on to this initial allowance endowment until the end, a firm would be able to offset up to Λ i units of emissions and start paying only if its actual cumulative emissions exceeded that level. This is the cap part of a cap-and-trade scheme. Depending upon their views on the demands for their various products and their risk appetites, firms may choose production schedules leading to cumulative emissions in excess of their caps. In order to offset expected penalties, they may engage in buying allowances from firms which expect to meet demand with fewer emissions than their own cap. This is the trade part of a cap-and-trade scheme.
In the simplest form of a cap-and-trade scheme, allowances are distributed at the beginning of each compliance period. However, there is no real reason to force the allocation of allowances to take place at one single timepoint t = 0. For example, in the 2007-2012 phase of the EU-ETS, allowances are allocated in March each year, while the five-year compliance period starts in January. We deal with more general setups in section 6, where we assume that the distribution of pollution permits is given by adapted stochastic processes {Λ i t } t=0,1,...,T −1 . For the sake of consistency, we will denote by
the total allowance endowment of firm i before the end of the compliance period, and we will use the notation
for the cap (i.e., the total allocation). We make the following assumption throughout the paper. Assumption 0.
(2.5)
In other words, we do not consider scenarios where the regulator does not give away any permit. A cap-and-trade scheme does not make sense without allocation of pollution permits! This leads the way to further generalizations of the allowance distribution scheme. In this paper, we will consider the following procedure. The regulator rewards firms with allocations which, at each time t = 0, 1, . . . , T −1, depend in a specific algorithmic way on their production ξ i t . In other words, we will consider cases where Λ As our analysis will show, existence, uniqueness, and characterization of some of the equilibrium price processes depend only upon the total number of emission permits issued during the compliance period, not on the way the permits are distributed over time and among the various participating installations. However, as we will demonstrate, the statistical properties of consumer costs and windfall profits depend strongly upon the way permits are allocated. The challenge faced by policy makers is to optimally design these allocation schemes to minimize consumer costs while satisfying emissions reduction targets, controlling producers windfall profits, and setting incentives for the development of cleaner production technologies. We shall concentrate on these special allocation procedures in sections 6 and 7.
Allowances are physical in nature, since they are certificates which can be redeemed at time T to offset measured emissions. But firms do not have to wait for the time of compliance to buy and sell allowances, and the latter can change hands at each time t = 0, 1, . . . , T . Because compliance takes place at time T , and only at that time, and because entering a forward contract does not require any initial capital (not even owning the commodity), it is natural to allow the trading of emission allowances at times t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 to be done via forward contracts settled at time T . Under these conditions, and without any loss of generality, one can also restrict trading of the actual allowance certificates to time t = T . At times t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, each firm can take very large long and short positions, irrespective of the actual number of allowance certificates actually existing. However, except for financially settling the outstanding forward contracts, trading at time t = T can only be done with existing allowances that can be delivered, hence the specific set of restrictions which we will have to impose at that time. Allowing trading in forward contracts provides a more flexible setting: it is more general than considering only spot trading, since it allows for trading pollution permits even before these allowances are issued and allocated. This turns out to be an important feature when dealing with general allocation schemes. In our mathematical model, a simple no-arbitrage argument implies that for t < T , the forward and spot allowance prices differ only by a discounting factor, such that trading allowances or forwards gives the same expected discounted payoff at time T . Therefore, under the equilibrium definition that will be introduced in section 3, considering only forward trading yields no loss of generality.
We denote by A t the price at time t of a forward contract guaranteeing either physical or financial settlement of one allowance certificate at maturity T and by A = {A t } t=0,1,...,T its time evolution. As we just mentioned, A T is the spot price at time T . The terminology forward price at time t is misleading as there is no exchange of funds at time t. A t is better seen as a strike than a price: it is the price (in time T currency) at which the buyer at time t of the forward contract agrees to purchase the allowance certificate at time T .
Each firm can take positions on the forward market, and we denote by θ i t the number of forward contracts held by firm i at time t. As usual, θ 
because, for each t = 0, . . . , T − 1, holding a position θ t in a forward contract through the time interval [t, t + 1] yields the cash flow
at maturity T . This follows from the very concept of forward trading: if the position θ t is taken at time t and held until maturity, then the agent receives at time T the difference θ t (A T − A t ). Thus, holding a position θ t through [t, t + 1] is equivalent to opening a position at time t by purchasing θ t units and closing this position at time t + 1 by purchasing −θ t units, and holding both until maturity. Notice that even though firms can take very large long or short positions, each sale must be offset by a purchase and vice versa, so that the clearing constraint 
and satisfies the clearing conditions (2.9)
and the compliance constraints
T is the number of (physical) allowances surrendered by firm i for compliance, and is used for the computation of the potential penalty given by (2.15 
Profits.
As we argued earlier, it is natural to work with T -forward allowance contracts because compliance takes place at time T . By consistency, it is convenient to express all cash flows, position values, firm wealth, and goods values in time Tcurrency. As a side benefit, this will help us avoid having to discount cash flows in the computations to come. So we use for numéraire the price B t (T ) at time t of a Treasury (i.e., nondefaultable) zero coupon bond maturing at time T . We denote by {S k t } t=0,1,...,T the adapted spot price process of good k ∈ K and, according to the convention stated above, we find it convenient to work at each time t with the T -forward price
we omit the dependence on T from the notation of the T -forward price as T is the only maturity we are considering.
Hence, a cash flow X t at time t is equivalently valued as a cash flow X t /B t (T ) at maturity T . So, if firm i follows the production policy
t=0 , its instantaneous revenues at time t from goods production is given by
and its time T -forward value is given by
The total net gains from producing and selling goods are thus (2.12)
In order to hedge their production decisions, firms trade on the emissions market by adjusting their forward positions in allowances. In addition, at maturity T , each firm i redeems allowances to cover its emissions and/or pay a penalty. Let
be the actual cumulative emissions of firm i when it uses production strategy ξ i . We also suppose that there exist other sources of emissions on which firm i has no control, denoted by ∆ i ≥ 0 and supposed to be an F T -measurable random variable. If we think of electricity as one of the produced goods, for example, the presence of this uncontrolled source of emissions can easily be explained. Usually electricity producers are required to hold a reserve margin in order to respond to short time demand changes and to protect against sudden outages or unexpectedly rapid ramps in demand. When scheduling their plants it is not yet known how much of this reserve margin will be used. Therefore, in most markets there is an uncertainty in the exact emission level when a production decision is made.
On a first reading ∆ i can be thought of as being 0 for the sake of simplicity. We shall see later in the paper that its presence helps in characterizing the equilibrium of the economy and that it is a useful tool for modeling several variations of the model. Introducing the net amount Γ i of allowances that producer i ∈ I can use to offset the scheduled emissions by (2.14)
the total penalty paid by firm i at time T is
Combining (2.12) and (2.15) with (2.8), we obtain the following expression for the terminal wealth (profits and losses at time T ) of firm i:
To emphasize the mathematical technicalities of the model, we underline the fact that demands and production costs change with time in a stochastic manner. The statistical properties of these processes are given exogenously, and are known at time 0 by all firms. Moreover, we always assume that these processes satisfy the constraints (2.1) and (2.2) almost surely. Firms adjust their production and trading strategies in a nonanticipative manner to their observations of the fluctuations in demand and production costs. In turn, the production and trading strategies ξ i and θ i become, respectively, adapted stochastic processes on the stochastic base of the demand and production costs.
Market Equilibrium.
In this section, we treat the common apprehension that a realistic market state is described by prices which correspond to a so-called market equilibrium, a situation in which the demand for each product is covered, all financial positions are in zero net supply, and each firm is satisfied by its own strategy. We define such an equilibrium and provide necessary conditions for its existence.
Definition of Equilibrium.
For any 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ and for any normed vector space F , we introduce the following space of adapted processes:
We also introduce the spaces of admissible production strategies,
and the spaces of admissible trading strategies,
In order to avoid possible problems with existence of the expected values of the random variables appearing in (2.16), we assume that the uncontrolled emissions and the production costs are integrable.
In what follows, we also use a technical assumption on the nature of the uncontrolled emissions. Even though this assumption is not needed for most of the equilibrium existence results, it will help us characterize the prices in equilibrium by ruling out pathological situations. This technical assumption states that up until the end of the compliance period, there is always uncertainty about the expected pollution level due to unpredictable events as described in section 2.3 in the sense that, depending upon the information available at time T − 1, the sum of all the Γ i 's has a continuous distribution. More precisely, we shall assume the following.
Assumption 2. The F T −1 -conditional distribution of the total uncontrolled emissions ∆ := i∈I ∆ i possesses almost surely no point mass, or equivalently, for all
As we have already pointed out, this technical assumption will help us refine the statements of some of the results in equilibrium. Following the intuition that, given price processes
t=0 , each firm aims to increase its own wealth by maximizing
over its admissible investment and production strategies, we are led to define equilibrium in the following way.
such that (i) all financial positions are in zero net supply, i.e.,
(ii) supply meets demand for each good,
(iii) each firm i ∈ I is satisfied with its own strategies in the sense that
Equilibrium in the BAU Scenario.
When the penalty π is equal to zero, in other words, in the absence of a climate policy and an emission market, our equilibrium theory should recover what is known as the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. As we explain below, it is characterized by the classical merit order production strategy, which can be described in the following way. At each time t, and for each good k, all the production means of the economy are ranked by increasing production costs C i,j,k t . Demand is met by producing from the cheapest production means, and good k's equilibrium spot price is the marginal cost of production of the most expensive production means used to meet demand D k t . In order to prove this claim we notice that if (A * , S * ) is an equilibrium when π = 0, the optimization problem (3.4) of firm i becomes sup
The objective function to maximize is the sum of a function of the production strategies and a function of the investment strategy. Moreover, since the feasible set is a product, trading and production strategies are decoupled and we can maximize the two terms separately. Production strategies and the prices of the goods are determined by the first (and only meaningful) optimization problem, which reads like a classical competitive equilibrium problem where each firm maximizes
and the equilibrium prices S * are set so that supply meets demand. The solution of this equilibrium problem is given by the following linear program. For each good k ∈ K,
for all times t. The associated equilibrium prices are
This is exactly the merit order pricing mechanism described earlier. In the case of electricity, it can be observed in most deregulated electricity markets without an emission trading scheme. Conversely, it is easily seen that the above prices together with the above strategies define an equilibrium. In section 4 we will see that even under an emission trading scheme, the dispatching of production among producers is still a merit-order-like dispatching with costs adjusted to take into account the mark-to-market value of emissions.
Necessary Conditions for the Existence of an Equilibrium.
Before turning to the full characterization of the equilibria, we present some necessary conditions that will provide interesting insight. (3.12) up to sets of probability zero.
(ii) Under Assumption 2, the price process A * is almost surely given by
The spot prices S * k and the optimal production strategy ξ * i correspond to a merit-order-type equilibrium with adjusted costsC
We first show that A * has to be a martingale. This is seen as follows: If not, there exists a time t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} and a set A ∈ F t of nonzero probability such that E t {A * t+1 1 A } > 1 A A * t (resp., <). Then, for each agent i ∈ I, the trading strategy given byθ
outperforms the strategy θ * i , contradicting the third property of an equilibrium.
To prove (3.11) and (3.12), notice that according to the definition of the equilibrium, θ * i T (ω) coincides for almost all ω ∈ Ω with the maximizer of
Note that the function ϕ * i is either affine or continuous and piecewise affine with two linear pieces. As a consequence, we conclude that A * T ∈ [0, π] almost surely. Indeed, if A * T (ω) < 0, then all the linear pieces have positive slopes and there is no finite maximizer to (3.14) . On the other hand, if A * T (ω) > π, then for every i ∈ I, the maximizer of ϕ * i is z = −Λ i (ω), which does not give an equilibrium either since i∈I θ
, which is different from 0 with strictly positive probability.
Further, observe that
. Since this holds almost surely for each i ∈ I, the following inclusions are satisfied almost surely as well:
and, consequently,
Since i∈I θ * i T = 0 because of the first equilibrium condition, the event on the righthand sides of (3.16) is a set of probability zero. This implies inclusion (3.11) .
Consequently, using again the fact that i∈I θ * i T = 0, we get the desired inclusion (3.12):
Condition (ii) is a direct consequence of condition (i) and Assumption 2. In order to prove condition (iii), we first notice that the optimization problem for firm i reads (3.19) sup
and we argue as before that for every ξ i ∈ U i the inner supremum can be attained by maximizing pointwise inside the expectation. This inner supremum is attained at
which is up to null sets the maximizer of
We use essentially the same argument as before together with the fact that we now know that A * T can take only the values 0 or π almost surely. Fix any ξ i ∈ U i . On {A * T = 0} the optimal value of (3.20) is 0. On the other hand, on {A * T = π} it follows from ∆ i ≥ 0 that the optimal value of (3.20) is −(Γ i + Π i (ξ i ))π. In both cases, the optimal value of (3.20) is almost surely
T . Hence, the outer optimization problem reduces to
where we have used again the martingale property of A * . Comparing the above optimization problem with (3.8), we observe that the equilibrium can be seen as a competitive production equilibrium with adjusted costsC
This concludes the proof.
Remark 3. The proof of inclusions (i)-(ii) was carried out under fixed ξ * . Hence, it is straightforward to extend Proposition 3.1(i)-(ii) to the case where the allocation depends on production strategies.
The above results provide a better understanding of what a potential equilibrium should be. The allowance price must always be in [0, π], which is very intuitive since buying an extra allowance at time t will result in a gain of at most π at time T . As highlighted in the previous subsection, the equilibrium in the BAU scenario can be related to a global cost minimization problem. We shall see in the next section that the equilibrium in the presence of a trading scheme enjoys the property of social optimality in the sense that any equilibrium corresponds to the solution of a certain global optimization problem, where the total pollution is reduced at minimal overall costs. We call this optimization problem the representative agent problem. Note that it is sometimes called the informed central planner problem. Beyond the economic interpretation of social optimality, the importance of the global optimization problem is that its solution helps calculate the allowance prices in equilibrium. We now explore this connection in detail.
Equilibrium and Global Optimality.
In this section, we show rigorously the existence of an equilibrium as defined in Definition 1. We do so by framing the problem as an equivalent global optimization problem involving a hypothetical informed central planner whom we call the representative agent. We prove the equivalence of the two approaches, and as a by-product of the necessary condition proven in the previous section, we derive the uniqueness of the allowance price process.
The Representative Agent Problem.
For each admissible production strategy ξ = {ξ i } i∈I ∈ U, the overall production costs are defined as
and the overall cumulated emissions as
Using the notation
for the aggregate uncontrolled emissions minus the allowance endowments, the societal costs from production and penalty payments can be defined as
We introduce the global optimization problem
which corresponds to the objective of an informed central planner trying to minimize overall expected societal costs. Recall that ξ is admissible if ξ ∈ U, i.e., if the demand is met and the capacity constraints are satisfied. The reason for the introduction of this global optimization problem is contained in the second necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium. 
In order to do so we notice that
where we have used the fact that in equilibrium, i∈I θ * i t = 0 holds for all t = 0, . . . , T due to the clearing condition (i) of Definition 1. Next we use the convexity inequality 
Now, for each ξ ∈ U we define θ(ξ) as
The above denominator does not vanish by assumption and, clearly, θ
Moreover, repeating the above argument for (θ(ξ), ξ) yields
Applying the third property (each agent is satisfied with its own strategy) of the (A * , S * ) equilibrium to the optimal investment and production strategies (θ
This holds for all ξ ∈ U, completing the proof. The existence of an optimal ξ for the global optimization problem (4.4) follows from standard functional analytic arguments.
Proposition 4.2. Under Assumption 1, there exists a solution ξ ∈ U of the global optimal control problem (4.4).
Our proof relies on two simple properties which we state and prove as lemmas for the sake of clarity. First, we note that
, equipped with the norm
, the duality form being given by
Next, we consider the weak [20] ), namely, the weakest topology for which all the linear forms
is lower semicontinuous for the weak * topology. Proof. Obviously, the real-valued function
is continuous for the weak * topology since it is of the form ξ −→ X, ξ for some
} is a fixed element in L 1 by assumption. So we only need to prove that the real-valued function
is lower semicontinuous. Using the fact that for any integrable random variable X one has
one sees that
and hence that the function , respectively, showing that the constraints defining U are satisfied in the limit, implying that ξ ∈ U.
(ii) Since U is a convex norm-closed subset of L 1 , it follows from the HahnBanach theorem that U is the intersection of halfspaces containing U, i.e., of the form 4.2. Relation to the Original Equilibrium Problem. As a consequence of Assumption 2, for each production policy ξ ∈ U, no point masses occur in the F T −1 -conditional distribution of Γ − Π(ξ). Hence, for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1 we have
In the next theorem, we show that the value of the conditional probability in (4.12) characterizes the equilibrium allowance price at time t. To prepare for the proof of this important result, we first prove a technical lemma. 
holds almost surely.
(
ii) If Assumption 2 is satisfied, then for each k ∈ K and i, i ∈ I, j ∈
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, where A t = πP t (Γ + Π(ξ) ≥ 0).
Proof. (i) Assertion (4.13) is proven in the following way. If it does not hold, the F t -measurable set O := {E t (G(ξ)) < E t (G(ξ))} has positive measure, i.e., P(O) > 0, and can be used to outperform ξ by ξ defined as
Note that since ξ and ξ coincide at times 0, . . . , t− 1, this definition yields an adapted process ξ ∈ U. With (4.15), we have the decomposition
which gives a contradiction to the optimality of ξ because
(ii) Let us now assume that ξ
, and let us consider, at time t, a small deviation from the global optimal strategy ξ consisting in a shift in production of h t > 0 units of the good k ∈ K, whereby the firms i ∈ I and i ∈ I increase and decrease their outputs from technologies j ∈ J i,k and j ∈ J i ,k , respectively, in such a way that the new policy ξ + χ with
and let λ 0 along a countable set (0, 1] ∩ Q. By dominated convergence, we have 
and since both limits should be nonpositive by part (i), we conclude that
almost surely. Hence, the inclusion
holds almost surely, which is equivalent to (4.14).
We can now turn to the main result of this section. 
Since conditions (3.5) and (3.6) are obviously fulfilled, we focus on (3.7). We first
where θ i (ξ i ) is constant and equal to 0 until time T − 1 and
since A defined by (4.17) is a bounded martingale. For each ξ i ∈ U i , we show that we can maximize the above quantity by computing the maximum pointwise in θ i inside the expectation. In view of (4.17), when ω ∈ {Γ + Π(ξ) < 0} we have A T (ω) = 0 and the maximum of the function
is a maximizer. On the other hand, when ω ∈ {Γ + Π(ξ) ≥ 0}, we have A T (ω) = π, the maximum of (4.19) is attained at any point
, and once again θ i (ξ i ) is a maximizer. Notice for later reference that, in both cases, the value of the maximum of (4.19) is almost surely −(
To finish the proof, we prove that
. According to the above computation, we have
We now show that the following inclusions hold almost surely:
Inclusion (4.22) is a direct consequence of definition (4.18) of the price process S.
Using this same definition (4.18) and Lemma 4.5, we see that
These inclusions allow us to show that E[L
completing the proof of (i).
(ii) Proposition 3.1 gives the form of an equilibrium price. Due to part (i) of Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 4.1, in order to prove almost sure uniqueness of the allowance price process, it is sufficient to prove that for any two solutionsξ,ξ of the global optimization problem (4.4) we have
We know that these production strategies are solutions of the global problem (4.4), which we rewrite as a linear programming problem:
Each solution (ξ , Z ) of (4.24) satisfies is also a solution to (4.24) for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. In view of (4.25), we conclude that, for each λ ∈ [0, 1],
+ holds almost surely. Since the above assertion is obviously violated on
this union must have probability 0, which, together with Assumption 2, yields (4.23).
(iii) Assume on the contrary that there exists an equilibrium price process S * with (4.27)
for all ω ∈ B for some t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, B ∈ F t , P(B) > 0, and k ∈ K. Let ξ * be the corresponding equilibrium strategy. Since the equilibrium allowance priceĀ is unique, it follows from (4.22) that
up to sets of probability zero. Consequently, we obtain 
which follows from the definition ofS. Moreover, (4.27) implies that
From (4.28), (4.29), and (4.30) we conclude that there exists C ⊆ B with
for all ω ∈ C, which implies that S * cannot be a set of equilibrium prices for the goods.
Remark T −1 t=0 ) i∈I , and for any choice of an equilibrium production schedule ξ * ∈ U, we define the reduction costs RC as the random variable given by the difference between the production costs C(ξ * ) under this production schedule and the production costs incurred in the same random scenarios had we used the BAU equilibrium production schedule. In other words, the reduction costs are given by the random variable
Notice also that, as defined, the reduction costs do not depend upon the trading strategies of the individual firms in the emissions market. Remark 8. The results of this section were derived under the assumption that the emission coefficients e
i,j,k are constant. However, by mere inspection of the proofs, the reader will easily be convinced that all the results remain true if these emission coefficients are instead adapted stochastic processes in L 1 T −1 (R).
Prices and Windfall Profits in the Standard
Scheme. The previous sections were devoted to the introduction and mathematical analysis of what we called the standard emission trading scheme. This cap-and-trade scheme was chosen because it is representative of the implementation of the first phase of the EU-ETS. In this section, we define rigorously the concept of windfall profit. This is done in section 5.1. In section 5.2, we elucidate the fact that free allocation of allowances can be used to create strong incentives for the use of the cleaner technologies.
However, because our analysis of cap-and-trade schemes would not be complete without numerical evidence from realistic examples based on market data, we spend half of this section introducing a case study that we use for illustrative purposes throughout the paper. For the purpose of numerical computations, we restrict our attention to an economy where one single good is produced. We choose the example of electricity because the power sector is one of the most important sources of worldwide GHG emissions. We study the impact of regulation on spot prices and producer profits. In order to provide specific insight into the effects of cap-and-trade legislations, we have performed numerical simulations of equilibrium prices and optimal production schedules by solving the global optimization problem (4.4) using data from the Texas electricity market. We introduce some of the intricacies of this market in section 5.3, where we also describe the elements of the economy. Details on the stochastic models used for the exogenous processes of demand and production costs, together with details on the calibration of their parameters, are given in the appendix at the end of the paper. Section 5.4 gives a first set of numerical results illustrating some of the major criticisms voiced against cap-and-trade schemes. We report numerical findings from this case study throughout the remainder of the paper.
Windfall Profits and
Penalty under the Standard Scheme. As explained above, the pricing mechanism of the standard emissions trading scheme induces a significant wealth transfer from consumers to producers.
Another way of understanding the extra profits made by the producers is to consider the windfall profits defined as follows. In the general framework of a standard cap-and-trade system with multiple goods, if ξ * is an optimal production strategy associated with the equilibrium (A * , S * ), we define the target priceŜ
This price is the marginal cost under the optimal production schedule without taking into account the cost of pollution. We then define the windfall profits of firm i as
and the overall windfall profits as
These windfall profits measure the profits for the production of goods in excess of what the profits would have been had the same dispatching schedule been used and had the target prices (e.g., the marginal fuel costs) been charged to the end-consumers without the cost of pollution.
Remark 9. A reasonable definition of the windfall profits of firm i could have been
in which the penalty payments due to the scheme are withdrawn from the extra profits.
Since producers decide upon their production strategies and therewith the risk of paying the penalty, we take the point of view that they should pay the penalty and not the end-consumer. However as can be seen in Figure 5 .1, the penalty payments vanish in comparison to the windfall profits as defined in (5.2). Hence, in practical applications, both definitions give similar results. Figure 5 .1 shows the distribution of windfall profits as computed in the example of the Texas electricity market that we describe in section 5.3. We observe that the windfall profits are on average almost 10 times higher than actual abatement costs. Furthermore, it also shows that the costs of expected future penalty passed on to customers are much higher (4637 times) than the penalty actually paid. This is consistent with the deterministic example presented in the introduction.
Incentives for the Use of Cleaner Technologies.
Using (4.20) we see that the expected profits and losses of firm i ∈ I in an equilibrium (A * , S * ) with associated production schedules ξ * are given by
As shown in Theorem 4.6, both the equilibrium price processes (A * , S * ) and the production strategies ξ * are preserved under a change of the regulatory allocation from ((
holds almost surely. However, such an adjustment of the allocation changes the expected profits and losses of producer i ∈ I by the amount
Obviously this creates a money transfer from producers withΛ i − Λ i < 0 to producers
If the initial allocation can vary with the type of production plant, it is possible to set it up in order to increase or decrease the income of clean or dirty plants, respectively. In other words, the initial allocation can be used to adjust incentives to build and run cleaner plants.
Even though our model concerns only the management of existing technologies and does not address the important issue of investment in the development of cleaner technologies, the mechanism highlighted above is one of the most powerful tools put into the hands of policy makers by a cap-and-trade scheme. Clearly, this leverage will disappear if auctioning of the allowances is used, for example, to control windfall profits.
We now elaborate on this last point. First, we notice that even an auction of 100% of the allowances cannot reduce windfall profits to zero with certainty. This is obvious in a market with many nuclear power plants and where coal is always on the margin. Indeed, in such a market, nuclear power producers make huge windfall profits and, since their emissions are essentially zero, they do not need any allowances. Hence, auctions can only affect the windfall profits of the coal-fired plant owners. In summary, if the regulator chooses an auction to control windfall profits, a huge part of the initial allocation, if not all the allowances, should be auctioned. However, in this case, the regulator loses control of the incentives afforded by the free allocation of allowances. The analysis presented in the next section was motivated by this dilemma: we propose alternative cap-and-trade schemes that not only reduce windfall profits essentially to zero, but also provide a considerable number of allowances that can be allocated for free. But first, we describe the case study we use for illustration purposes.
A Model for Electricity and Carbon Trading in Texas.
To perform numerical simulations, we chose to focus on the electricity sector in Texas. Texas has an installed capacity of 81,855 MW, mainly split into gas-fired (51,489 MW), coal-fired (23,321 MW), and nuclear (9,019 MW) power plants. These figures are based on the installed capacity in 2007, including additional nuclear and coal-fired power plants that are planned to come online over the next 7 years. Including upcoming capacity slightly changes the production stack and leads to more interesting results than when using the actual 2007 installed capacity. Nuclear technology has close to zero emissions, and it is always running in base-load. The source of emission reduction thus essentially comes from switching fuel between gas and coal.
So, for all practical purposes, our model for Texas can be assumed to involve one good, electricity, produced from two different technologies, gas and coal. Stochastic costs of production are equal to C i,j,k t = H j P j t , where j ∈ {g, c}, H j is the heat rate of technology j, and P j t is the corresponding fuel price. D t stands for the electricity demand from which nuclear capacity has already been subtracted. We set the emission rates to 0.42 ton/MWh for gas technology (typical CCGT-like plant) and 0.95 ton/MWh for coal technology. These average emission rates have been chosen to give a faithful representation of Texas' park of power plants.
The global optimization problem reads
where Γ is defined in (4.2) as the adjusted uncontrolled emissions. In the particular case of two technologies, we can proceed to the change of variable (ξ
, where
are, respectively, the total emissions and the cost of production for the period [t, t + 1). Using the constraint that the demand has to be met, we obtain an equivalent formulation in terms of an emission abatement problem:
where
are, respectively, the minimal and maximal emissions at time t and (5.7)
is the fuel spread per ton of CO 2 (or abatement cost). The fuel spread F represents the marginal switching cost necessary to decrease emissions by 1 unit. We observe that the above formulation (5.6) involves only two exogenous stochastic processes, D and F . Finally, we set the aggregated uncontrolled emissions i∈I ∆ i infinitesimally small to stay in the realm of the assumptions of Theorem 4.6, and we solve the global optimization problem by stochastic dynamic programming on a two-dimensional trinomial tree. Further details are given in the appendix at the end of the paper.
Electricity Price Impact under the Standard Scheme.
In this subsection, we discuss the impact of regulation on electricity prices. We have already emphasized that uniqueness of equilibrium electricity prices is not guaranteed. However, we identified the minimal price among all possible equilibrium prices in (4.18) . In what follows, we focus on this price. Equation (4.18) shows two sources of change in the spot price compared to BAU. First, the marginal technology may be different: this induces a variation in marginal cost. This variation is likely to be positive, but a negative variation is possible. Suppose, for example, that in a BAU scenario coal is started first but that demand is high enough that gas is the marginal technology. Suppose that in the presence of the trading scheme, the allowance price is high enough to induce a fuel switch, so that gas is started first. Assume also that demand is high so that coal is the marginal technology. In this case, the variation in marginal cost can be negative. The second source of variation is the price of pollution e i,j,k A * t for the marginal technology. The producers pass the cost of expected penalties through to end-consumers. This second contribution is always positive and is such that the spot price under the trading scheme is always greater than the spot price in BAU.
A possible interpretation of (4.18) is that the allowance price enters the electricity price as the price of an additional commodity besides fuels that is used for power generation. Producing the last infinitesimal unit of electricity at time t not only induces costs due to extra fuel consumption, but also increases the emissions by e i,j,k and hence also the expected penalty at time T by e i,j,k A * t . Consequently, these costs have to be covered by the end-consumers for the marginal production of product k to be profitable. Since this amount is passed on to the end-consumer in each timestep, the consumer cost
)D t is much bigger than the penalty that is actually paid. As we will see in what follows, the consumer costs also exceed by far the reduction cost of the scheme. Figure 5 .1 quantifies both the penalty payments and the consumer cost and compares them to reduction costs and windfall profits (as defined in the next section) under a standard trading scheme for the Texas electricity sector. The penalty and initial allocation for this example are π = $100 and θ 0 = 1.826 × 10 8 allowances, respectively. This allocation corresponds to a reduction target of 10%, i.e., a cap of 1.827 × 10 8 t carbon, to be reached with 95% probability. The results depicted in Figure 5 .1 illustrate the major criticism articulated by some of the opponents of cap-and-trade systems: end-consumer costs are approximately more than 10 times higher than reduction costs due to the trading scheme. Hence the consumers' burden exceeds by far the overall reduction costs, which gives rise to significant extra profits for the producers.
Alternative Designs for Emission Trading Schemes.
The main objective of emission trading schemes is to use market mechanisms to force producers to reach a certain reduction target and, at the same time, to give incentives to develop and build cleaner production facilities. As explained in the introduction, this last objective cannot be fully investigated in the framework of our equilibrium models since they are limited to the optimization of the production from already existing technologies. Despite this limitation, and in view of the shortcomings of the standard cap-and-trade scheme demonstrated in the previous section, we propose alternative designs which fulfill both objectives at low reduction costs, low windfall profits, and hence low costs transferred to the consumer. This is possible because the mathematical theory developed in the previous sections allows us to study emissions reduction policies that are different from the standard EU-ETS scheme.
In section 6.1, we introduce a general (and fairly complex) cap-and-trade scheme including taxes and subsidies. We argue that the theoretical results derived earlier in the paper for standard schemes can be transferred to this more general framework. The remaining part of the section is devoted to the identification and calibration of two of the simplest particular cases: a relative scheme introduced in section 6.3 and a carbon tax introduced in section 6.4 which can equivalently be viewed as a particular case of the BAU scenario discussed in section 3.2. The final section 6.5 provides comparative statistics highlighting the differences between these schemes based on the case study of the Texas electricity market.
General Market Designs for Emission Trading Schemes.
We first generalize the allocation procedure. Beyond the allocation Λ i t for firm i at time t, the regulator is now allowed to distribute credits dynamically and proportionally to production. To be more specific, at each time 0 ≤ t < T , firm i is provided with an allocation
. In addition, the regulator can also tax or subsidize the various firms by means of financial incentives or disincentives similar to the credit endowments described above. In this case, the profits of the firms are lowered at time t by an amount
represent a tax when positive and a subsidy when negative. Examples of positive Z i,j,k include fuel and carbon taxes. The combination of V i and Z i,j,k allows for the introduction of alternative regulation such as a system of reward/penalty with respect to a given production (or equivalently emission) target. Under such a generalized capand-trade scheme, the terminal wealth (or profits and losses) of firm i ∈ I reads
We can still use Definition 1 of an equilibrium for such a generalized scheme. Indeed, Definition 1 carries over by merely replacing
The present formulation gives a general framework for the analysis of a broader class of cap-and-trade schemes. We mostly focus on two important particular cases: (1) the case where Z i,j,k t ≥ 0 varies with i and j, which leads to a scheme based on a fuel or emission tax scheme, and (2) the case where Z i,j,k t ≤ 0 depends only on k, which corresponds to a subsidy for the production of good k.
Given that the dependence of the generalized allocation (6.1) and the taxes and subsidies (6.2) upon the production schedule ξ is affine, and given the repeated remarks we have made to this effect, most of the results of the first part of the paper (including the existence and properties of the equilibrium prices) do apply to the present situation. However, because the statements of these generalizations would have been more involved and the proof more technical, we chose to present them first in the seemingly restrictive framework of standard cap-and-trade schemes in order not to distract from the gist of the analysis. In the next section, we give equivalence results providing rigorous and enlightening proofs of these generalizations.
For an equilibrium (A * , S * ) of the generalized scheme with associated strategies (θ * , ξ * ), it is straightforward to extend the definition of windfall profits of firm i as
the overall windfall profits being defined as
and used in this form in the case study of the Texas electricity market.
Equivalence between Equilibria.
In this subsection, we restrict ourselves to allocation coefficients of proportionality Y i,j,k t , which depend upon the good, but which are the same for all firms and all technologies, and we often use the notation Y i,j,k t = Y k t . In this case, the proportional part of the new allocation (6.1) can be rewritten as
The main thrust of this subsection is to identify one-to-one correspondences between equilibria of generalized schemes with allocations given by (6.1) and equilibria of standard schemes with allocations of the form
where the stochastic process Ξ in
The following proposition contains the main theoretical results of this section. 
then the couple of price processes (A * , S † ), where 
form a market equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium allowance price process is almost surely unique, while the process S is the smallest equilibrium price in the sense of Theorem 4.6.
(iii) The conclusions of (ii) still hold when the processes Z i,j,k can also depend upon the firm i ∈ I and the technology j if we use the adjusted parameters defined by In particular, if we choose (X i ) i∈I and (Y k ) k∈K so that
we deduce that there is a one-to-one correspondence between generalized schemes and standard schemes with initial allocation Λ i . We will elaborate on this in section 7. In order to prove Proposition 6.1, we shall need the following lemma. Lemma 6.2. Let A be a martingale,
, and let S, S be two integrable price processes, such that
where Z k ≤ 0 is a subsidy; then we have
Proof. The right-hand side of (6.14) is equal to
and using the martingale property of A, it can be expressed as
which is the left-hand side of (6.14).
We can now turn to the proof of Proposition 6.1. 
Proof. (i) Let
where we used the optimality of the equilibrium strategies (ξ * , θ * ) of the standard scheme in (6.15) . This holds for all (θ , ξ
, which proves condition (iii). The converse can be proved in exactly the same way.
Assertion (ii) follows directly from (i) and Theorem 4.6, while Remark 3 gives the martingale property of A * . Finally, the proof of part (iii) is straightforward. Note that the above proof also shows that not only do allocation prices coincide, but so do equilibrium production strategies. Thus the switching costs of the generalized cap-and-trade schemes are the same as for the standard cap-and-trade schemes with adjusted uncontrolled emissions (Γ i ) i∈I . The above discussion suggests that windfall profits could be reduced with a relative allocation rule constant over time. This motivates the following analysis.
Cap-and-Trade Schemes with Relative Allowance Allocation.
A positive relative allocation for good k ∈ K, i.e., the assumption that Y i,j,k t = y k > 0 for every i ∈ I and those j ∈ J i,k , can be seen as a subsidy for good k that is given in the form of allowances rather than in cash. Under such an assumption, when producing one unit of good k, the marginal expected penalty increases only by (e i,j,k − y k )A * t rather than by e i,j,k A * t as in a standard scheme. Thus the net marginal overall production costs of the firms are lower when compared to the standard scheme. This should result in a decrease of the price of good k. In the present subsection, we study the simplest generalized cap-and-trade scheme taking advantage of this mechanism by setting
In what follows, not only do we discuss this relative cap-andtrade scheme, but we also gain new insight into the standard cap-and-trade scheme by treating it as a relative cap-and-trade scheme with y k = 0 for all k ∈ K. In the case study of the Texas electricity market, we do not give this relative allocation to nuclear production. This does not influence the equilibrium prices or the equilibrium production strategies since marginal production costs for nuclear power plants are far below marginal costs for gas and coal power plants, even if emissions and relative allocation are priced into gas and coal. Under these considerations it is straightforward to extend Proposition 6.1 to apply to such an allocation rule as well.
But for any comparison of the different cap-and-trade schemes to be meaningful, we need to calibrate their respective parameters to common characteristics. We now proceed to the discussion of such a calibration procedure.
Calibration of the Parameters.
The relative scheme introduced in this section has three regulatory parameters. Using the notation of this section, they are (1) the penalty π, (2) the relative allocation coefficients (y k ) k∈K , and (3) the total initial allocations x = i∈I x i given to the firms i ∈ I. In this subsection we show, again using the example of the Texas electricity market, how one should choose these parameters in order to guarantee an emissions reduction target with given probability while keeping the expected windfall profits near zero and controlling the reduction costs to keep them as low as possible. In the particular simulation used to illustrate the strategy, we choose an emissions reduction target of 1.827 × 10 8 , to be reached with probability 95%.
To gain a first insight into the numerics, we fix the penalty π at $100. The left pane of Figure 6 .1 gives the expected windfall profits, while the right pane gives the 95% percentile of the total emissions for different values of the relative allocation coefficient (y e ) and the expected total allocation. It appears that the expected allocation controls the amount by which carbon emissions are reduced, while the relative allocation coefficient y e controls the windfall profits. Designing a cap-and-trade scheme with zero windfall profits and preassigned emissions target levels can be done by choosing the parameters of our relative scheme at the intersection of the zero windfall profit level set with the 1.827 × 10 8 emission percentile level set. This procedure is depicted in Figure 6 .2. We find y e = 0.54 and i∈I x i = 5.4 × 10 7 . Since for the standard cap-and-trade scheme the parameter is zero (i.e., y e = 0), we have one less regulatory parameter to calibrate. And since controlling the emissions level is of the utmost importance, it takes precedence over the control of the windfall profits. So in a standard cap-and-trade scheme, the initial allocation is chosen to reach the emission target and the windfall profits follow without being controlled. Hence, the desired parameter values are obtained at the intersection of the 1.827 × 10 8 emission percentile level set with y e = 0, giving the initial allocation i∈I x i = 1.826 × 10 8 . Repeating the above procedure for different penalty levels gives regulatory settings with different production costs for the relative and standard schemes in Figure 6 .2. Obviously the reduction costs are lowered by increasing the penalty for both schemes. As shown in the right pane of Figure 6 .2, this decrease in reduction costs is significant until the penalty reaches the level π = $100. After that, the reduction costs stay nearly the same, becoming independent of π for larger values of π. Hence, we conclude that in this setting a penalty of $100 is a reasonable choice for both the relative and the standard schemes.
Emission Taxes.
A static tax scheme (known in the popular press as a carbon tax ) is a regulation that penalizes the emission of each ton of carbon by a fixed amount, say, z > 0. Since there is no penalty, no allocation, and no trading, it is natural to view a carbon tax as a BAU scenario with adjusted production costs
Using the results of section 3.2, we see that in such a scheme the prices of goods follow a merit order pricing rule with effective production costs given by C i,j,k t + e i,j,k z for all (i, j, k) ∈ M and t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Earnings under a tax scheme are based on the spread of these effective production costs. Since this spread does not depend exclusively on the differences between the production costs associated with the various technologies available, it is in general not clear how to predict what the windfall profits will be. It is not even clear if they can be negative or positive. To gain some insight on this issue, consider a tax of z = $60 (which is realistic for a 10% reduction target, as will be seen below), and assume that at some point in time the marginal production costs of coal and gas are the same while all plants have to run to satisfy the demand. In this case the spread in effective production cost is (e c − e g )z = $31.80 and will be earned for each MWh that is produced with gas. Hence, the windfall profits are $31.80 per MWh of electricity produced with gas. However, in the case of BAU, the earnings are zero.
Like a standard cap-and-trade scheme, a tax scheme has only one regulatory control parameter: the tax level z. As explained above, this single parameter should be calibrated in order to guarantee a specified reduction target. Thus the windfall profits are automatically given by the reduction target and cannot be controlled.
Comparison of the Various Abatement Schemes.
We now compare the characteristics of the standard and relative cap-and-trade schemes with the regulatory parameters chosen in the previous subsection.
We first consider the windfall profits and the consumer costs. The results are given in Figure 6 .3. As expected, the relative scheme gives much lower consumer costs than the standard scheme. This is related to the fact that the windfall profits have a narrow distribution around zero in the case of the relative scheme, while the windfall profits of the standard scheme are 10 times higher than the reduction costs. When compared to the standard scheme, the only drawback of the relative scheme seems to be the slightly higher level of reduction costs, which can be observed on the right pane of Figure 6 .4. However, since this cost increase corresponds to approximately $0.40 per MWh, it is small in comparison to production costs and thus can be neglected in practice. Moreover, those higher production costs are often justified by higher emission reductions as can be seen on the left pane of Figure 6 .4. In particular, the relative scheme takes advantage of cheap fuel switches when the standard scheme cannot reduce emissions anymore. Moreover, the relative scheme is less sensitive to weather, since in warm winters less allowances are allocated, thereby pushing the price up. This in turn is responsible for higher emission abatements and consequently higher abatement costs. In this example of a relative scheme, approximately 30% of the allowances are given as initial allocation; by allocating them to clean plants, further incentives can be set to build cleaner plants. This seems to be an important advantage of the relative scheme over other mechanisms such as auctioning and tax.
Next, we study the effect of an emission tax on the Texas electricity market. Figure 6 .4 shows that a pure tax scheme that fulfills the above reduction target of 1.827 × 10 8 t CO2 with 95% probability is, on average, more than twice (2.4 times) as expensive as the standard cap-and-trade scheme. These extra costs are paid-for extra emission reductions. However, in contrast with the results in the case of the relative scheme, the average cost increase per reduced ton of carbon is considerable when we compare it to the case of the standard scheme. The reason is that a tax is not flexible enough to control emissions when abatement costs are stochastic. This results in an emission uncertainty that exceeds even the BAU uncertainty by several orders of magnitude. Notice, moreover, that it carries a significant risk of reducing nearly no emissions. In such a scenario the tax corrections for upcoming years will be extremely expensive. Needless to say a tax scheme induces a huge money transfer from consumers to the regulator, which, as can be seen in Figure 6 .4, is even bigger than the costs transferred to the consumer in a standard cap-and-trade scheme.
More Financial Incentives.
One of the main arguments in favor of the relative schemes studied in the previous section is the fact that they reduce windfall profits. However, this reduction comes with slightly higher reduction costs than in the case of the absolute scheme. While this cost increase is negligible in practice, it is of great theoretical interest to understand how and why one can design schemes that give exactly zero windfall profits at exactly the same reduction costs as the standard capand-trade scheme. In order to do so, we identified in Proposition 6.1 the generalized schemes which are in a one-to-one correspondence with the production policies of the standard scheme. The latter are given by a subclass of generalized schemes for which Z 
At is bounded from above. Since
it follows that which concludes the proof. This scheme ensures the existence of an equilibrium with zero windfall profits and exactly the same reduction costs as the standard cap-and-trade scheme, without any extra money transfer from consumer/producer to regulator, as, e.g., would be the case for auctioning. A further advantage compared to auctioning is that it allows one to distribute the amount i∈I X i t differently to control the incentives to build cleaner plants.
The drawback of this scheme is that it requires a random allocation (following a prespecified rule) of allowances dynamically through time. Moreover, the daily allocation can be negative at times for some producers. But this should not be a problem, as seen in the Green Certificate Schemes.
Notice further that it suffices to give a relative allocation only to those plants which are frequently on the margin. Therefore, in the electricity markets, the relative allocation does not need to be given to nuclear plants.
The theoretical results of this section suppose market rules that may be difficult to enforce in a real market. However, they show how the different levers brought by the generalized schemes can be used to keep the prices of goods at a low level.
Conclusions.
In this paper we introduced a new mathematical framework for competitive equilibrium, in which emissions trading schemes can be analyzed. This framework is general enough to accommodate tax-based abatement policies, existing cap-and-trade schemes such as those implemented in the first phase of the EU-ETS, as well as new market designs.
The main thrust of the paper is to provide policy makers and regulators with the tools necessary to design and implement cap-and-trade schemes capable of reaching reasonable pollution targets at low reduction costs while controlling windfall profits and incentives for cleaner production technologies.
On the one hand, we develop a rigorous mathematical theory for competitive economic models in which stochastic demand and production costs are given exogenously. We prove existence of an equilibrium in which price processes for goods and pollution appear endogenously and pollution prices are unique.
On the other hand, we provide analytic and computational tools to analyze and compare the various emissions trading schemes. Regulators and policy makers need to understand the structure and role of these new markets vis-à-vis pollution control, and we view these tools as crucial in the design and implementation of sound environmental economic policy.
The computational tools developed in this study provide, for each market design:
• Monte Carlo scenarios generators for equilibrium prices of goods and pollution allowance certificates; • computations of, for each scenario of demands for goods and fuel costs, -pollution levels, -end-consumers costs, -producers windfall profits, -reduction costs. Finally, as illustration of the versatility of the tools developed for the qualitative analysis of cap-and-trade schemes considered in the paper, we implement them in a case study of the Texas electricity market.
As observed in the SOx and NOx California RECLAIM program and at the end of the first implementation phase of the EU-ETS, cap-and-trade systems can fail as too generous an allocation of pollution permits will serve as a disincentive for emissions reductions and deflate pollution prices. However, our numerical experiments prove that cap-and-trade schemes can work in the sense that emissions targets properly chosen can be reached at low costs.
Moreover, we use our computational tools to provide a thorough comparison of a sample of alternative schemes: the standard scheme inspired by the first EU implementation phase, an emission tax scheme, and a relative scheme in which allowance distributions are driven by instantaneous (as opposed to historical) production levels. Among other things, we show that the relative allocation scheme that we propose can reduce average windfall profits essentially to zero while keeping reduction costs at nearly the same level as the standard cap-and-trade scheme. Moreover, this relative scheme allows the control of the incentives to build new plants. Table 8 .1 summarizes the results of our comparative analysis of standard capand-trade schemes (whether or not they include auctioning of allowances) with tax schemes and the relative scheme which we introduced in this paper. 
9.
Appendix. This final section contains the technical details of the implementations used to produce the numerical results presented in the paper.
Model Calibration.
We chose to run the numerical experiments with data from the Texas electricity market because it relies on an independent grid, with few interconnections to the rest of the country. For this reason, it is possible to analyze the impact of an emission reduction policy without having to take into account emission leakage. In sections 9.1.1 and 9.1.2, the demand for electricity and the fuel switch price process are specified using continuous-time processes, Note that we write the time parameter in parentheses instead of using a subscript, to indicate continuous-time processes. Moreover, the horizon for continuous time is [0, T ], where we suppose that T equals one year. By sampling (9.1) at discrete times, we obtain discrete-time versions of the processes with a daily timestep resolution, and we use these versions for numerical purposes.
Electricity Demand Process. The continuous-time demand process is modeled by

D(t) = min{(P D (t) + X D (t))
+ , κ
where κ n , κ c , and κ g represent Texas nuclear, coal, and natural gas capacities, respectively, and where P D (t) represents the mean/deterministic component of the demand and is modeled as Figure 9 .1. These parameters were identified in two steps. First, the deterministic harmonics appearing in (9.2) were identified from peaks in the Fourier transform. Second, after removing the deterministic part {P D (t)} t∈ [0,T ] (red line in the figure) , the residual component Notice that, for the computation of the estimates of (ϕ i ) 6 i=0 , long periodicities were computed with a yearly periodic Fourier transform, while short periodicities were computed with a weekly periodic Fourier transform. using linear regression as depicted in Figure 9 .2 and explained in section 9.1.3. We obtained the following estimates for the parameters of the fuel switch price process: 
